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After the Dust Settles: Military Tribunal Justice for
Terrorists After September 11, 2001
"No man, no nation, is above the laws of common decency and
morality. No man may stand higher than, or be exempt from, the
law."
- JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN 1
Introduction
It should be understood from the outset that military courts-
martial are not the same thing as military commissions.2 Both are
venues through which military jurisdiction is exercised,3 but they
are very different in procedure and practice.4 Military courts-
I JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES vi
(1954).
2 Military commissions are a type of military tribunal.
3 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES Part I para. 2(b) (2000 ed.).
4 Everett and Silliman gave an excellent summary of the differences between a
court-martial and a military commission:
If trial is to be by a general court-martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, which
mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence and are set out in the Manual for Courts-
Martial, would probably apply. The same rules of evidence would not apply,
however, to the trial of a foreign offender by a military commission. Similarly,
while a provision of the Geneva Convention states that a prisoner of war may be
sentenced only by the same courts and according to the same procedure that
would apply to persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining powers,
this provision applies only to crimes committed while a prisoner of war, and not
for a violation of the law of war committed while a combatant. Finally,
although the system of appellate review prescribed for the court-martial of a
servicemember would also apply to a general court-martial of a foreign national
for crimes against the law of war, it would not apply in a similar prosecution
before a military commission. Rather, Congress is free to authorize a different
appellate process, which would be subject to only very limited review in the
federal courts.
Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses Against the
Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 509, 516-17 (1994). See also APPLEMAN,
supra note 1, at x. For a thorough discussion of jurisdictional differences between
military courts-martial and military commissions, as well as an excellent discussion of
the history of both venues, see Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions
and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Distinctions Between the Two Courts, 2002 ARMY L. 19.
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martial are governed by the Manual for Courts-Martial,5 and differ
in many ways procedurally from the military tribunals ordered by
the Bush administration.6 Military tribunals are not governed by
any one particular set of codified rules or procedures; rather, their
practice is governed by the presidential or congressional order that
created them.7 Courts-martial are reviewable by the Court of
Criminal Appeals of the particular branch of armed service under
which the offense arises.8 This decision is reviewable by the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,9 composed of civilian
justices who are appointed by the President for fifteen-year
terms. 0 In turn, these decisions are ultimately reviewable by the
United States Supreme Court."
In stark contrast, the 2001 Order calling for the creation of
military commissions (Military Commission Order) and that
setting forth the procedures for the military commissions (Military
Commission Rules) only provide for review by the appointing
authority; military officers; a review panel of three military
officers appointed by the Secretary of Defense (which may include
commissioned civilians); the Secretary of Defense; and ultimately
5 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2000 ed.).
6 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Military Commission Order]. See also Department of Defense, Military
Commission Order No. I at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321.pdf
(Mar. 21, 2002 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter Military Commission Rules].
7 Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 516-17.
8 RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL Ch. XII, Rule 1203, reprinted in MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2000 ed.); UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE Ch.
47, Subchapter IX, § 866 Art. 66, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED
STATES (2000 ed.).
9 RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL Ch. XII, Rule 1204, reprinted in MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2000 ed.); UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE Ch.
47, Subchapter IX, § 867 Art. 67, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED
STATES (2000 ed.).
10 CLERK OF THE COURT, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES 1 (Oct. 2001 ed.), at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
II RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL Ch. XII, Rule 1205, reprinted in MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2000 ed.); UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE Ch.
47, Subchapter IX, § 867a Art. 67a, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED
STATES (2000 ed.).
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the President. 12 Thus, with this Military Commission Order, and
the Military Commission Rules that followed, the Executive
branch completely usurps all review power of Article III courts
and allows the President, or the Secretary of Defense (if the
President so authorizes) to stand in the place of the Supreme Court
of the United States or any International Court in existence.13
The use of military commissions has precedent in both
American and customary international law, and the ramifications
of their use has been and may yet prove to be problematic for both
domestic and international relations. Additionally, the Bush
administration may have been incorrect in its determination of the
status of some of the captured combatants, and thus may be setting
injurious precedent for the armed forces of the United States. This
comment will initially set forth the historical context in which
military commissions came into use. Part I contains a discussion
of presidential powers in times of crisis and the historical
underpinnings of the doctrine of necessity." Part 11 highlights
important Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of military
commissions by the United States. 5 Part III briefly summarizes
the Geneva Conventions as background for Part IV, which
discusses prisoner of war status and the laws of war.'6 Parts V and
VI shed light on proposed and enacted legislation after September
11, 2001, focusing on military commissions and the use of force.'7
In conclusion, this article posits that while the use of military
commissions as a venue has precedent in both U.S. and
international law, the procedures set forth for the current
commissions may be problematic in practice. 8
Historical Context
Military commissions as institutions were in existence before
the adoption of the United States Constitution, 9 and are
12 Military Commission Rules, supra note 6, § 6(H)(3)-(6).
13 See id § 6(H)(6).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 56-84.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 85-114.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 115-61.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 162-278.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 279-86.
19 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 111 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1997) (1947).
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sometimes referred to as the American Common Law War
Courts. 2' They have been traced back to twelfth century England,
where the Court of the Constable and the Marshal were
"established for control of the King's Army, appeals of death
penalties for murder committed out of the country, and the rights
of prisoners taken in war., 21  Furthermore, "it has been long
established that a victorious power may establish military tribunals
to try offenders against the laws of war., 22 Thus, the system of
justice using military commissions is not a new one, but is rather a
forum that has been utilized and accepted for at least 200 years.
After World War I, the right of the United States and the Allies
to try war criminals before military tribunals was recognized by
the peace treaties ending the war.24 After World War II, each of
the Allied Powers held military commissions following the
principles of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare,25 to accomplish
several primary objectives:
(1) To punish civilian and military leaders for waging aggressive
war and thereby to retard war mongering and to increase the
possibilities for a permanent peace;
(2) To punish persons responsible for the commission of war
crimes; [and]
(3) To crystallize certain laws of humanity and thereby to deter
the repetition of genocide and other oppressions of minority
groups and aliens.2 6
20 Id.; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 19 n.7 (1946).
21 Harold L. Kaplan, Constitutional Limitations on Trials By Military Commissions
3 (1943) (unpublished Doctor of Juridical Science dissertation, New York University
School of Law) (available in microfiche at the University of North Carolina School of
Law Library) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
22 APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at 11. See also MacDonnel, supra note 4, at 27 ( By
1780 the jurisdiction of military commissions to try enemy soldiers for war crimes had
been established.).
23 MacDonnel, supra note 4, at 27.
24 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 12 n.1 (citing Art. 128 of Treaty of Versailles, June
28, 1919; Art. 173 of Treaty of St. Germain, Sept. 10, 1919; Art. 157 of Treaty of
Trianon, June 4, 1920).
25 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (James Brown
Scott ed., 3d ed. 1918), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 63-92 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1981).
26 APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at v (analysis of validity, fairness, and codification of
[Vol. 28
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As a result of these commission trials and the Nuremberg
hearings, the United States Supreme Court was flooded with
hundreds of habeas corpus petitions.27 Justice Jackson recused
himself initially from deciding upon the writs, due to his
participation in the first Nuremberg hearing. 28 The Court suddenly
split on whether it had the authority to decide writs of habeas
corpus in connection with detention prior to trial by military
commission.29 Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge
dissented virtually uniformly when the Court denied the
petitions.3 ° In June of 1950, the law pertaining to the writs was
definitively established with Johnson v. Eisentrager.3" This case
may be said to stand for the proposition that as long as detention,
trial, and punishment occur outside of the United States, then
Article III courts in the United States will not review military trials
of non-citizen terrorists through writs of habeas corpus.32
Justice Hugo Black gave voice to the division in the Court
regarding the hearing of the writs of habeas corpus when he wrote
that "military trials of civilians charged with crime, especially
when not made subject to judicial review are so obviously contrary
to our political traditions ... [and are] a radical departure from our
steadfast beliefs."33  I assert that Justice Black would thus
rules used in the Nuremberg trials, primarily from the perspective of a trial lawyer who
studied a great deal of international law).
27 Id. at xi.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Johnson v. Eisentrager can be interpreted to mean that Article Ill courts would
not review by writ of habeas corpus the trials of aliens by American military
tribunals sitting overseas so long as the trial, detention, and punishment have all
taken place overseas .... Furthermore, if the alien is seized overseas by
American forces for alleged violations of the law of war and brought to the
United States for trial in a civil or military tribunal, he would be unable to
contest jurisdiction, absent some heretofore unprecedented provision in an
extradition treaty between the United States and the country where the seizure
occurred.
Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 517-18.
32 Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 517-18.
33 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 317 (1946) (noting, however, that "[olur
question does not involve the well-established power of the military to exercise
jurisdiction over members of the armed forces, those directly connected with such forces,
2002]
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vehemently disagree with the current administration's
promulgated rules, which make military tribunal decisions
ultimately reviewable only by the President (or the Secretary of
Defense if the President gives him the authority to do so)."
This historical split in the Court reflects a dichotomy of
decision-making, a split personality in policy that runs deep in the
American fabric, going well beyond the walls of the Supreme
Court.35 Just as the current administration characterizes al Qaeda,
Taliban, and other extremist groups or sympathizers,36 early
American leaders also characterized slaves and Native Americans,
through simplification and distortion.37 If groups or individuals
are systematically denied their humanity, then they can be denied
their natural rights, or so the justification proceeds.38 "Before
there were 'war criminals,' there were 'barbarians,' 'heathens,'
and 'savages' who did not qualify as equals in the arena of
'civilized warfare."' 39 George Washington, in reference to Native
American resistance to colonization, "wanted to establish a
precedent of terror and believed that American national security
demanded it: 'Our future security will be in their inability to injure
us ... and in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement
they receive will inspire them." 4
or enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of
war."). It is important to distinguish the fact that Duncan was a U.S. citizen tried by
military tribunal when the courts of the United States were open and functioning; the
case did not involve the trial of an alien.
34 Military Commission Rules, supra note 6, § 6(H)(6).
35 See PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 20 (2000).
36 See Judith Shulevitz, The Close Reader; There's Something Wrong With Evil,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 7, at 39.
37 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 20.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 22 (quoting RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF
INDIAN-HATING AND EMPIRE BUILDING 331 (1980)).
The expansions which followed Christopher Columbus's voyage to the
Americas resulted in the destruction of great civilizations [such as] the Aztec,
Inca, and Maya. The Indians of Norlh America suffered a similar fate. Nearly
all of God's creation including land and labour were turned into commodities in
the capitalist sense of the word. People were kidnapped, bought, transported
and sold .... At the start of the 20th century, nearly all of the world's non-
Western peoples were under some form of Western domination, and remain
hopelessly trapped in structures of extreme inequality which is not merely
economic.
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The idea of using terror to accomplish a desired end is not a
new one. As illustrated above, it is one that was employed by the
founding fathers of the United States themselves.4' Theirs was a
form of state-sponsored terrorism, one that was heralded as heroic
and necessary in order to accomplish their notions of national
security.42 This historical account is not meant to be a justification
for the use of such means, just an illustration as to why the United
States may want to look in the mirror before pointing the finger at
the root causes of violence and terror, or dismissing the
motivations for terrorist acts as mere evil, a profoundly simplistic
assessment at best.43 This comment, however, is not meant to
conduct an examination of the root causes of violence and
terrorism, nor is it meant to be an examination of U.S. foreign
policy. Rather, this issue is explored to add historical context to
our discussion of the use of military commissions by the United
States to try terrorists after September 11, 2001. Whatever the
root causes may be, all should agree that the cycle of violence and
terror must stop somewhere." Actors must be held responsible for
wanton destruction and targeting civilians, whatever their motives
or justifications, and whomever the actors may be.
Just as terrorism must never be excused, so must genuine
grievances never be ignored. True, it tarnishes a cause when a
Eqbal Ahmad, Culture of Imperialism, at http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/
Library/9803/eqbalahmad/imperial.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
41 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 22. Eqbal Ahmad pointed out the ironic dichotomy
between the approach to state sponsored terrorism and to individual or group terrorism:
"The official approach to terrorism is the need for the moral revulsions we feel against
terror to be selective. We are to denounce the terror of those groups which are officially
disapproved. But we are to applaud the terror of those groups of whom officials do
approve." EQBAL AHMAD, TERRORISM: THEIRS & OURS 15 (Greg Ruggiero ed., 2001).
42 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 22.
43 See Shulevitz, supra note 36.
44 Justice Murphy warned:
War breeds atrocities. From the earliest conflicts of recorded history to the
global struggles of modern times, inhumanities, lust and pillage have been the
inevitable by-products of man's resort to force and arms. Unfortunately, such
despicable acts have a dangerous tendency to call forth primitive impulses of
vengeance and retaliation among the victimized peoples. The satisfaction of
such impulses in turn breeds resentment and fresh tension. Thus does the spiral
of cruelty and hatred grow.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
2002]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
few wicked men commit murder in its name. But it does not
make it any less urgent that the cause be addressed, the
grievance heard, the wrong put right. Otherwise, we risk losing
the contest for the hearts and minds of much of mankind.
We must act with determination to address, indeed solve, the
political disputes and long-standing conflicts which underlie,
fuel, and generate support for terrorism. To do so is not to
reward terrorism or its perpetrators; it is to diminish their ability
to find refuge or recruits, in any cause, any country. Only then
can we truly know that the war on terrorism has been won-and
the world made a safer, better, more just place.45
At the end of the nineteenth century, delegates gathered at the
Hague for the International Peace Conference in a concerted effort
to codify the rules of warfare and to come to consensus on
methods to settle crises peacefully in order to prevent wars.46 The
delegates at the Hague attempted not only to come together on
laws regulating war, but to codify rules on international relations
in general.47 An American delegate at the Hague, Joseph Choate,
saw the Conference as a positive sign signaling the prospect of
world peace.48 "They bring together all the Nations in very close
touch in the holy cause of humanity, and do much to promote the
brotherhood of man. ', 49 Unfortunately, despite the spirit with
which the delegates at the Hague Conference came together, it was
obvious that these laws of war did not apply to everyone all the
time.5 1 "Whether it was the U.S. Army fighting the Sioux on the
45 Press Release SG/SM/8518, United Nations, Terrorism is Global Threat, Says
Secretary-General, but Measures Against it Must Not be Used to Justify Human Rights
Violations (Nov. 21, 2002), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/
SGSM8518.doc.htm (statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan upon receiving
honorary degree at Tilburg University in the Netherlands) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter Annan
Statement].
46 About the United Nations: History of the UN, at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/history.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation); see MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 49.
47 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 49.
48 JOSEPH CHOATE, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 17 (1913).
49 Id. "[P]erhaps thousands now living will see the day when war, as a means of
settling international disputes, will be as generally condemned as the duel and slavery
and the slave trade are to-day. Perhaps this also is another dream! But who can tell?"
Id. at 44.
50 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 52.
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American Plains or the European armies fighting in Africa,
western armies fought with few restraints in nineteenth-century
colonial wars." 51
Some years after the first Hague Conference, after the dawning
of a new century, world leaders came together and tried again.
The Hague Conference of 1907 brought forty-four nations to the
negotiating table.52 After codifying the rules of war at the first
Hague Conference, delegates at the second turned to such radical
ideas as an international arbitration system.53 This second Hague
Conference further defined the rules of war and resulted in more
nations committed to following them, but the ambitious plan for
an international arbitration system was not fulfilled.54 A third
Hague conference was scheduled for 1914, but
[it] never convened, as hopes for international peace were
dashed by a bullet in Sarajevo.... The outbreak of World War
I in 1914 demonstrated how vulnerable international law was to
the aggressive policies of a nation ready, willing, and able to
employ military force. Once national survival was at stake,
55international law fell victim to military necessity ....
This historical context is meant to illustrate that there is a
disconnect in the precedent that the United States has set through
some of its actions and the way that the United States has labeled
the same types of actions when perpetrated by others. The
ramifications of this disconnect have come into full view with the
events of September 11, 2001.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 68. See also CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 1899-1914 (1975).
53 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 68.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 69-70.
The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the
Enforcement of Penalties of the Versailles Peace Conference, which met after
cessation of hostilities in the First World War, were of the view that violators of
the law of war could be tried by military tribunals.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 n.1 (1946) (citing Report of The Commission, March 9,
1919, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 121 (1920)).
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I. Presidential Powers and the Doctrine of Necessity
Presidential powers during times of emergency, sometimes
referred to as the Doctrine of Necessity, set the stage for a
continuing push and pull between the President and Congress in
the arena of war and foreign policy. A brief examination of
presidential powers in this context serves as a parallel to an
examination of the power to order military commissions to try war
criminals.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were not strangers to the
consequences of tyranny and the abuse of power. James Madison
warned, "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."56 Unfortunately, some
have asserted, the balance of powers laid out in the U.S.
Constitution have over the years become distorted into a
presidential government, where the people expect the President to
solve all of the nation's problems to the exclusion of Congress. 7
Combining executive power and executive purpose often
results in complex problems and equally, if not more, complex
solutions." One's ideas of how much power the President should
have in acting by necessity, with national security interests in
mind, are inescapably founded on individual views of foreign
policy and international relations. 9 This notion of necessity has in
the past provided a "wild card" allowing the President to act
outside the narrow proscriptions of the Constitution in certain
circumstances. 6  In 1810, Thomas Jefferson wrote from
Monticello:
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor
1999) (1961); see also Larry Berman, Presidential Powers and National Security, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A BICENTENNIAL VIEW 117, 117 (Howard E.
Shuman et al. eds., 1990).
57 Berman, supra note 56, at 118.
58 Id. at 122.
59 Id.
60 Id. Ruling by necessity is not without its supporters, "although President Nixon
boldly went where no predecessor had dared in declaring, 'when the President does it,
that means it is not illegal."' Id
[Vol. 28
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A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law
itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying
them with us; thus.. . absurdly sacrificing the end to the
means.
61
President Lincoln also expressed support for the underlying
justifications of the doctrine of necessity in a letter to Albert
Hodges, giving voice to the idea that the President should not be
constrained by the Constitution if for some reason our national
security demanded deviations from constitutional proscriptions:
I did understand... that my oath to preserve the Constitution to
the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving,
by every indispensable means, that government-that nation, of
which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to
lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general
law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be
amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save
a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might
become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or
wrong, I assume this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel
that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the
Constitution, if... I should permit the wreck of government,
country and Constitution altogether.62
Further supporting the theory behind a general doctrine of
necessity, Alexander Hamilton argued that "' [t]he general
doctrine, then, is that the executive power of the nation is vested in
the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications
which are expressed in the instrument., 63 He continued that the
Executive's duty is "to preserve peace till the war is declared; and
61 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1904).
62 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 10 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 65-68 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds.,
1894).
63 Letters of Pacifus: Written in Justification of the President's Proclamation of
Neutrality in ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 196 (Richard B.
Morris ed., 1957).
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in fulfilling this duty, it must necessarily possess a right of judging
what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the
country impose on the government. ... "64 In contrast, James
Madison responded by arguing "that only 'foreigners and
degenerate citizens among us, who hate our republican
government,' could believe that an inherent Executive power
existed."65  Madison saw such a claim as equivalent to the
tyrannical acts of the King of England.66 "The claim to inherent
Executive power is usually based on the President's own judgment
of a crisis or emergency. For paranoid Presidents this may cause
problems in constitutional balance .... ,67
Article I of the U.S. Constitution delegates to Congress the
power to declare war.68 Article II provides that the President shall
be Commander in Chief of the armed forces.69 In 1973, the War
Powers Resolution was enacted, setting forth specific guidelines
regarding the balance of powers between Congress and the
President in times of hostilities y.7  These guidelines did not end the
tug-of-war for power between Congress and the President in the
arena of war, one that continues to this day.7'
64 Id. at 197.
65 Berman, supra note 56, at 123 (quoting James Madison's "Helvidius No. 1" in
JAMES MADISON WRITINGS 537 (1999)).
66 Id
67 Id. at 124.
Nixon reasoned that as holder of the Executive power, a President can go
beyond his enumerated powers and take whatever steps that are necessary to
preserve the country's security, even if his actions might be unconstitutional.
This reasoning [may have] worked for Lincoln during the Civil War but could
not pass muster during Watergate.
Id.
68 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
69 U.S. CONST. art. !I, § 2, cl. 1.
70 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. ch. 33, §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
Id. § 1541(a).
71 See Alison Mitchell, Threats and Responses: The Congressional Debate;
Lawmakers Make Their Cases as Votes on Use of Force Draw Near, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
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Congressman Lee Hamilton once said, in response to
criticisms from Oliver North during a hearing before the House
Select Committee:
A democratic government as I understand it, is not a solution,
but a way of seeking solutions. It is not a government devoted
to a particular policy objective, but a form of government which
specifies the means and methods of achieving objectives .... If
we support that process to bring about a desired end-no matter
how strongly we may believe in that end-we have weakened
our country, not strengthened it. 72
After the Libyan air raid in 1986, republicans in the House of
Representatives introduced a bill that would have allowed the
President to respond independently and with deadly force to
foreign terrorism, without consulting Congress, thus exempting
the President from the War Powers Resolution.73  Senator
Jeremiah Denton (R-AL) indicated that the bill authorized the
assassination of any head of state personally involved in any
terrorist actions, stating that if Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi
"'became deceased as the result of our counter-strike, that would
have been within the intent of the bill."'' 74  "Libya provided a
'best-case' test of Presidential energy. Qaddafi constituted a
symbol of international terrorism to most Americans.... The
question falls squarely on one's faith in the President's defining
national security interests. 75
2002, at A14; see also Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed
Forces Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (Oct. 16, 2002).
72 Christopher Madison, Another Hero, 19 NAT'L J. 1940 (July 25, 1987).
73 Berman, supra note 56, at 130. See A Bill to Protect United States Citizens from
Terrorism (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986), H.R. 4611, 99th Cong. (1986).
74 Linda Greenhouse, Tension Over Libya: Tough Words from Moscow; Bill Would
Give Reagan a Free Hand on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1986, at A9. This type of
result would likely violate the law of war, which does
not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a
citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain
without trial by any captor, any more than the modem law of peace allows such
international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest
retaliation should follow the murder committed in the consequence of such
proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror
upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into
barbarism.
John Bassett Moore, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1119 (1906).
75 Berman, supra note 56, at 131.
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The conflict between the President and Congress can be traced
back to the Presidency of George Washington.76 It is not always
the President who causes controversy in trying to wield more
power than has been given to him. Congress also occasionally
refuses to follow clear Supreme Court precedent, perpetuating a
political controversy within the American system of justice. 7
War is a particularly contentious area in which all three
branches of government struggle for authority and accountability.
In Woods v. Miller, Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion,
spoke about his "explicit misgivings about war powers."78  He
asserted that the war power is the
most dangerous one to free government in the whole catalogue
of powers. It usually is invoked in haste and excitement when
calm legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is
difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes
moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by
judges under the influence of the same passions and pressures.
Always, as in this case, the Government urges hasty decision to
forestall some emergency or serve some purpose and pleads that
paralysis will result if its claims to power are denied or their
confirmation delayed. 9
Justice Jackson's misgivings about war powers are relevant to
any debate over how justice is best served when- dealing with
terrorists. The passions of the moment, driven by fear, anger,
hatred, ignorance, or vindictiveness, can easily turn the blind eyes
of justice into biased and unrelenting magnifying glasses, focused
on whomever is unfortunate enough to get in their way. This is
not to say that it is impossible for justice to be fair in times of
crisis, merely that such times by their very nature call for added
vigilance and care in carrying out justice. Such times also call for
a careful examination and reflective discourse about what justice
really means, or should mean, in a civilized and free world.
Turning from war powers and presidential authority in times of
76 Edwin Timbers, Legal Lessons in National Security, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: A BICENTENNIAL VIEW 357, 357 (Howard E. Shuman et al. eds.,
1990).
77 Id.
78 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
79 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (majority opinion holding that continuation of rent
control after termination of hostilities was a valid exercise of the war power).
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emergency to military commissions, both Congress and the
President possess powers to create and authorize such venues. 80
Article I, section 8, clauses 1, 10, 11, 14, and 18 of the U.S.
Constitution provide Congress with the authority to establish
military commissions.8' As the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces,82 the President possesses an inherent authority to appoint
military commissions without the express authority of Congress.83
"The shared power to create military commissions is unusual in a
government predicated on the necessity of a separation of powers;
it lies in what Justice Jackson called 'a zone of twilight in which
[the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority."' 84
The next section of this comment will elaborate upon the Supreme
Court's confirmation of the President's authority to establish
military commissions, as well as illustrate some of the problems
that may arise from the use of military commissions.
II. Supreme Court Precedent; War and the Constitution
The United States Supreme Court has had a number of
opportunities to "consider at length the sources and nature of the
authority to create Military Commissions."85 For example, in 1942
the Court concluded that the Constitution did not require the use of
a jury in military commission trials, nor did it require that
violations of the law of war be tried in civil courts.86 Further:
In another significant case resulting from the Allied victory in
World War II, the Supreme Court ruled that the Articles of War
granted jurisdiction both to general courts-martial and to
military commissions to try, as a violation of the law of war,
General Yamashita's alleged failure to prevent the mistreatment
of Filipinos by his troops.... The law of war was further
utilized by the Court to sustain the jurisdiction of military
80 MacDonnell, supra note 4, at 20.
81 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-11, 14,18.
82 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
83 MacDonnell, supra note 4, at 20. "Under customary international law, the right
of a military commander to establish and use military commissions to try suspected war
criminals is inherent to his authority as a commander." Id. at 22.
84 Id. at 24 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952)).
85 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 19, at 111.
86 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
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government tribunals established in the American-occupied
portion of West Germany, even when the defendants were
civilians.
87
While Congress had authorized the trial of enemy aliens by
military commission, the Supreme Court noted that until there was
an express suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by the
Executive branch, U.S. federal courts retained the power and, in
fact, the duty to examine the authority of military commissions if
such petitions were made, but only in the case where commissions
are held on U.S. soil or in a place where the United States
exercises sovereignty.88 The Supreme Court acknowledged in
1946 that the military tribunals' judgments and rulings were not
reviewable by the Court.89 The commissions at issue in the case of
In re Yamashita were reviewable by military authorities as
provided in the orders creating them, or as set forth in the Articles
of War.9" The military commissions that Congress had created did
not provide for any review to the Supreme Court except in cases of
writs of habeas corpus. 91  Four years later, the Court again
acknowledged that it would not review military commission
findings of fact. 92
87 Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 514-15 (citations omitted).
88 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (citation omitted). The Court notes that
Congress,
in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by Article I, § 8, Cl. 10 of the
Constitution to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of
Nations ... ," of which the law of war is a part, had by the Articles of War (10
U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593) recognized the "military commission" appointed by
military command, as it had previously existed in United States Army practice,
as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the
law of war.
Id. at 7.
89 Id. at 8.
90 Id.
91 Id. ("The courts may inquire whether the detention complained of is within the
authority of those detaining the petitioner.").
92 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 35 (2002) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950), Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).
The authority of military tribunals sanctioned by Congress for the prosecution
and punishment of offenders against the laws of war extends to prosecution and
punishment of enemy field commanders and other enemy combatants, and that
authority continues after the cessation of hostilities between the forces of the
United States and those of an enemy country, at least until peace has been
officially recognized by treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the
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If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and
condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely
because they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.
Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for
the military authorities which are alone authorized to review
their decisions.93
However, the Court did not say that military commission
verdicts or procedures are not reviewable for constitutionality; nor
did it say that the Supreme Court is without the authority to review
the order itself creating the military commissions for constitutional
violations. In fact, while the Court further recognized that it is not
in the business of creating the laws of war, it stated that it will
"respect them so far as they do not conflict with the commands of
Congress or the Constitution."94 In 1942, in Ex parte Quirin the
Supreme Court had occasion to consider a presidential order for
military commissions95 not unlike the current military order. 96 The
government.
Id. (citing Application of Homma, 327 U.S. 759 (1946)).
93 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted).
94 Id. at 16.
95 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942) ("The question for decision is
whether the detention of petitioners by respondent for trial by Military Commission,
appointed by Order of the President of July 2, 1942.... is in conformity to the laws and
Constitution of the United States."). The military order in question read as follows:
The President, as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, by
Order of July 2, 1942, appointed a Military Commission and directed it to try
petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War, and
prescribed regulations for the procedure on the trial and for review of the record
of the trial and of any judgment or sentence of the Commission. On the same
day, by Proclamation, the President declared that "all persons who are subjects,
citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give
obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time
of war enter or attempt to enter the United States ... through coastal or
boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing
to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law
of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals." The Proclamation also stated in terms that all such persons were
denied access to the courts.
Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted). The German saboteurs in Quirin were tried in
Washington, D.C., giving the Article III courts jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus
petitions. It has been held that the authority of Article III courts to hear such petitions
does not exist if the petitioner is an alien and the detention is outside of the United
States, i.e. in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72-73 (D.
D.C. 2002). The court in Rasul specifically held that Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was
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Court maintained that nothing in the President's proclamation
precluded the Supreme Court from determining whether the
Constitution or the proclamation allowed the trial of the defendant
by military commission.97
[T]he detention and trial of petitioners-ordered by the
President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander
in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public
danger-are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear
conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws
of Congress constitutionally enacted.98
Thus, while the current military order may not be found
unconstitutional because it does not provide for review by the
Supreme Court or any other Article III court, the Supreme Court,
in the proper circumstances, would likely not refuse to hear a case
challenging the constitutionality of a military commission decision
(so long as the challenge is not based on disputed facts alone), and,
of course, so long as the challenger had standing.
In Madsen v. Kinsella the Supreme Court specifically
recognized presidential authority to create military commissions,
absent any expressed congressional intent to the contrary.99 The
Court acknowledged that such commissions are "constitutionally
recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental
responsibilities related to war."1 ' Further, the Court in In re
Yamashita stated that "the power to prosecute violations of the law
of war ... rests, not with the courts, but with the political branch
of Government."'01
While the Court generally held that military commissions
outside the sovereignty of the United States. Id. The court further held that under the
precedent of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), "writs of habeas corpus are
not available to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States," serving
as the basis for the dismissal of the petitioners' claims. Id. The court did note, however,
that "this opinion, too, should not be read as stating that these aliens do not have some
form of rights under international law." Id. at 73.
96 See infra Part Vi.
97 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
98 Id.
99 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952) ("[I]n the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the
President's power, it appears that, as Commander in Chief... he may, in time of war,
establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions.").
100 Id. at 346.
101 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946).
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could deviate procedurally from other Article III trials, not every
Supreme Court justice agreed. In a particularly contentious
dissent, Justice Murphy asserted that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment applies to enemy belligerents in equal force as it
does to U.S. citizens:
Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole
philosophy of human rights which makes the Constitution the
great living document that it is. The immutable rights of the
individual, including those secured by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to the members of those
nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the
democratic ideology. They belong to every person in the world,
victor or vanquished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs.
They rise above any status of belligerency or outlawry. They
survive any popular passion or frenzy of the moment. No court
or legislature or executive, not even the mightiest army in the
world, can ever destroy them. Such is the universal and
indestructible nature of the rights which the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects when life or
liberty is threatened by virtue of the authority of the United
States.
The existence of these rights, unfortunately, is not always
respected. They are often trampled under by those who are
motivated by hatred, aggression or fear. But in this nation
individual rights are recognized and protected, at least in regard
to governmental action. They cannot be ignored by any branch
of Government, even the military, except under the most
extreme and urgent circumstances.1
0 2
Would Justice Murphy view current terrorist threats and
actions against the United States as sufficiently extreme and
urgent? In regard to the trial at issue in In re Yamashita, Justice
Murphy claimed that the charges were improper, that the accused
was not given sufficient time to prepare a defense, that he was
sentenced summarily to be hanged, that the basic rules of evidence
did not protect the accused, and that there was a fundamental
problem with the fact that the defendant was not charged with any
personal participation or even knowledge of war crimes." 3
Murphy went on in his dissent to describe the trial of the defendant
by military commission for acts of officers under his command as
102 Id. at 26-27 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 27-28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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unworthy of the traditions of our people or of the immense
sacrifices that they have made to advance the common ideals of
mankind. The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be
satisfied. But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of
the boundless and dangerous implications of the procedure
sanctioned today. No one in a position of command in an army,
from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. Indeed,
the fate of some future President of the United States and his
chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have been sealed
by this decision. But even more significant will be the hatred
and ill-will growing out of the application of this unprecedented
procedure. That has been the inevitable effect of every method
of punishment disregarding the element of personal culpability.
The effect in this instance, unfortunately, will be magnified
infinitely, for here we are dealing with the rights of man on an
international level. To subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair
trial, to charge him with an unrecognized crime, or to vent on
him our retributive emotions only antagonizes the enemy nation
and hinders the reconciliation necessary to a peaceful world. 104
Justice Rutledge also dissented:
Not heretofore has it been held that any human being is beyond
[the Fifth Amendment's] universally protecting spread in the
guaranty of a fair trial in the most fundamental sense. That door
is dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it. For once
it is ajar, even for enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back
wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all.'05
Justices Rutledge and Murphy thus gave voice to an objection
that is particularly applicable today, namely that the United States
should be careful in choosing the means to carry out justice for its
''enemies," lest those same "enemies" choose to follow its
examples in carrying out their ideas of justice against it. Justice
Rutledge cautioned that "It was a great patriot who said: 'He that
would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a
precedent that will reach to himself."" 6
Justice Murphy again dissented in Homma v. Patterson,
warning of a result of a system of justice predicated on notions of
104 Id. at 28-29 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 79 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 588 (Foner ed., 1945)).
[Vol. 28
MILITARY TRIBUNAL JUSTICE
revenge alone:
This nation's very honor, as well as its hopes for the future, is at
stake. Either we conduct such a trial as this in the noble spirit
and atmosphere of our Constitution or we abandon all pretense
to justice, let the ages slip away and descend to the level of
revengeful blood purges. Apparently the die has been cast in
favor of the latter course. °7
He further pointed out that the principles of justice codified in
the U.S. Constitution are not "artificialities or arbitrary
technicalities" but rather are the "very life blood of our
civilization" and thus not to be forgotten in the heat of the moment
when acting hastily on vengeful impulses. °8
But tomorrow the precedent here established can be turned
against others. A procession of judicial lynchings without due
process of law may now follow.... A nation must not perish
because, in the natural frenzy of the aftermath of war, it
abandoned its central theme of dignity of the human personality
and due process of law. 10 9
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government."10
The language cited above is relevant in the policy debate
about the use of military commissions. However, it is important to
note in this discussion of trying terrorists that the Supreme Court
does not have jurisdiction to decide upon writs of habeas corpus
filed by aliens who are held and tried outside of the United States:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other
country where the writ [of habeas corpus] is known, has issued it
on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no
stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor
107 Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759, 759 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 760-61 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
110 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866).
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does anything in our statutes."'
The majority of the Court, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, stated
that there are in fact allowable distinctions among which
constitutional protections will apply:
Modem American law has come a long way since the time when
outbreak of war made every enemy national an outlaw, subject
to both public and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder. But
even by the most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish
inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world
between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and
of enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy aliens who
have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy
aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to,
enemy governments. 112
Thus Johnson v. Eisentrager can be cited as authority for the
proposition that Article III Courts should not afford trials to al
Qaeda terrorists living outside of the United States who
nonetheless travel to the U.S. to commit violations of the law of
war. Rather, they would presumably be triable by military
commissions: "[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who
has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even this
qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable
claims upon our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be
helpful to the enemy.""' 3
The distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants (or
belligerents) has therefore been important for the U.S. Supreme
Court in determining who may be lawfully subject to trial by
military commission." 4 The Geneva Conventions set the stage for
these classifications, and the next section will briefly discuss the
Conventions, leading to section IV, which will discuss the
classification of unlawful combatants in the context of affording
prisoner of war status. Classification among combatants is
important because it will determine whether the prisoners captured
as a result of the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001, or the
l Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950). See also Rasul v. Bush, 215
F. Supp. 2d 55, 72-73 (D. D.C. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 198
(4th Cir. Va. Jan. 8, 2003) (deciding upon writ of habeas corpus for American citizen
labeled as an enemy combatant).
112 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768-69 (footnote omitted).
113 Id. at 776.
114 See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942).
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ongoing war on terrorism, will be triable by military commissions
or whether they will have access to trial by Article III courts in the
United States.
III. The Geneva Conventions
This section provides background on the classification of
prisoners captured in hostilities, setting forth an abbreviated
overview of the Geneva Conventions. In 1949, delegates gathered
at the Hague to codify the laws governing the treatment of
prisoners and other persons during armed conflicts.115 The results
were codified as follows: the First Geneva Convention (Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field); the Second Geneva
Convention (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea); the Third Geneva Convention (Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War); and
the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).1 16 In 1977, the
four Geneva Conventions were supplemented by two Protocols:
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts; and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 17 With particular
attention paid to prisoners of war, the Third Geneva Convention
codified rules regarding the treatment of prisoners captured in
conflict, rules which reflect a basic understanding of human rights
and dignity. 18
The Geneva Conventions are meant to apply in all cases of war
or armed conflict between the High Contracting Parties, 19
115 NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
n.4 (2d ed. 1999).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, from the White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Office of Communications (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WL
191071.
119 The Third Geneva Convention states that:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to
disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their
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regardless of whether either of them has formally declared a state
of war.12 ' Furthermore, even if one of the parties to a conflict is
not a party to the Conventions, those that are, nonetheless, must
abide by its terms in the conflict, in relation to not only parties to
the Conventions but in relation to those not parties to the
Conventions.' 2 1
Following World War II, criticism of the Nuremberg trials "led
to an article common to each of the four Geneva Conventions
which requires each signatory to 'undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention. ' ,"122  Everett and Silliman
assert that the United States complied with this article "through
enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.
Articles 18 and 21 of the Code refer to the use of general courts-
martial as well as military commissions for the trial of offenses
against the law of war."'
' 23
respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their
programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles
thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire
population. Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume
responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the
Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 127, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 98, 932 U.N.T.S. 13, 136
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].
120 Geneva Convention, supra note 119, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 2-3, 932 U.N.T.S. at 136.
121 Id.
122 Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 511 (citing to Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 4 Bivens 853; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 4 Bivens 853; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418, 4
Bivens 853; Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 4 Bivens 853; 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(1988); 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1988)) ("These Articles were preceded by similar
Articles in the former Articles of War. Compare 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (1941) with 10
U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946 (West 1994)").
123 Id. at 511. The authors indicate that:
The purpose of this article is to explore a potential alternative forum to the
International Tribunal for trying and punishing offenses against the law of
nations.... In particular, the article addresses whether American military
tribunals are a realistic alternative to a specially constituted tribunal when trying
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IV. Prisoners of War; Unlawful Combatants & The Laws of
War
As stated above in Part II, classification is important in
determining whether captured combatants will be subject to trial
by military commission or whether they will have access to trial
by Article III courts in the United States. The Third Geneva
Convention sets the groundwork for determining this
classification, and will be discussed in detail in this section.
Apprehending and trying war criminals is undoubtedly an
important aspect of armed conflicts, equally as important as
procedures adopted to engage and ideally defeat the enemy.124
Further, it has been recognized that congressional power includes
the ability to mandate the trial by military commission of these
war criminals.125
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (the Third Geneva Convention) indicates that:
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. (2)
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that
of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d)
that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who
such offenses. For example, could an American military commander deployed
with his forces to another country in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement
operation prosecute a Saddam Hussein or a General Aidid? The answer is that
he can, and there is historical precedent for the use of military commissions or
other military tribunals for this purpose.
Id. at 510.
124 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 35 (2002) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950)).
125 Id. (citing Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).
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profess allegiance to a government or an authority not
recognized by the detaining power.' 2
6
Under customary international law, the capturing party to the
hostilities must make individual determinations about the status of
those persons captured,121 presumably to prevent innocent civilians
from being caught up in the process unnecessarily, or to ensure
that those who are deserving of the protections of the Geneva
Conventions receive them. Both of these goals would be thwarted
if one presumed to be able to classify all who are to be captured in
the future without any individualized determinations whatsoever.
"No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every
captured man in arms of a levy en masse as a- brigand or a
bandit."'28
"Partisans" are soldiers who may be detached from their
regular unit or main body for the purpose of infiltrating enemy
territory, but are armed and wear the uniform of their army, and
are thus entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. 29  On the
other hand,
[m]en, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, .... without
commission, without being part and portion of the organized
hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war,...
such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and
therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of
prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway
robbers or pirates. 130
Customary international law'.' further indicates that hostilities
126 Geneva Convention, supra note 119, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 4-5, 972 U.N.T.S. at 138
(emphasis added).
127 Moore, supra note 74, at § 1109(52).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 1109(81).
130 Id. § 1109(82).
131 "Customary international law refers to the legal obligation created by the
'conjunction of a general practice of states with states' belief that they are legally obliged
to adhere to the practice."' J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted
Killings " Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 n.9 (2002) (quoting A.
MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II 2
(1997)), Newton discussed the evolution of international criminal law:
[lI]nternational criminal law evolved from interactions between sovereign
states. International law codifies specific offenses through treaties and also
recognizes crimes based upon violations of customary international law. ...
[]nternational criminal law defines offenses as "a result of universal
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must be commissioned by a state in order to bring the combatants
into the protection of the law of nations. 32 A primary focus of this
requirement is the wearing of uniforms, which enables combatants
to distinguish between civilians and belligerents on the battlefield.
The requirement of state commission allows accountability and
some degree of order, if such can be accomplished in war:
If war were to be waged by private parties, operating according
to the whims of individual leaders, every place that was seized
would be sacked and outraged; and war would be the pretence to
satiate private greed and spite. Hence, all civilized nations have
agreed in the position that war to be a defence to an indictment
for homicide or other wrong, must be conducted by a belligerent
state, and that it can not avail voluntary combatants not acting
under the commission of a belligerent. But free-booters, or
detached bodies of volunteers, acting in subordination to a
general system, if they wear a distinctive uniform, are to be
regarded as soldiers of a belligerent army. 1
33
The distinction between those fighting under the orders of a
nation and guerilla bands, even if in uniform, is that the latter are
considered outlaws, punishable as robbers and murderers; whereas
the former are considered part of the forces of the belligerent
nation and thus entitled to protections as such. 134 The law of war
was clearly violated when the World Trade Center, and most
importantly civilians, became a target for terrorist actions:
The measure of permissible devastation is to be found in the
strict necessities of war .... Destruction ... is always
illegitimate when no military end is served, as is the case when
churches or public buildings, not militarily used and so situated
or marked that they can be distinguished, are subjected to
bombardment in common with the houses of a besieged town. 135
If waging war on the United States were indeed the terrorists'
motive, while the Pentagon could arguably be considered a proper
military target, the World Trade Center could not. It has been
condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress
them." Accordingly, any state has jurisdiction to punish international crimes.
Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals
Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1996) (citations omitted).
132 Moore, supra note 74, at § 1109.
133 Id.
134 Id. (citations omitted).
135 Id. at § 1113.
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theorized by some that the fourth plane that crashed in rural
Pennsylvania was intended for the destruction of the White
House.136 Arguably, the White House could be considered a
military target, for while there are certainly civilians present in and
around the White House; it is the residence and office of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, this is subject matter for another debate.
While it is apparent that under the Third Geneva Convention
individuals taken in conflict by their enemies may be classified as
prisoners of war and afforded all the protections and privileges
that come with such a classification, others may not. "By the law
and practice of civilized nations, enemies' subjects taken in arms
may be made prisoners of war; but every person found in the train
of an army is not to be considered as therefore a belligerent or an
enemy." '137 There are always those in the middle of a war, whether
by accident or on purpose, who may neither expect nor reasonably
could be considered belligerents, such as innocent civilians who
are captured due to their proximity to those fighting in the
conflict. 38
Those who violate the laws of war are sometimes said to have
committed war crimes, and their trial for such offenses depends on
their classification as well as the time that they are alleged to have
committed the offense. "The term 'war crimes' was first widely
used during and after World War I. More often than not, war
crimes accusations were propaganda designed to fuel the moral
outrage necessary for modem war."' 3 9 In 1996, the United States
Congress codified the War Crimes Act, sending a message to the
world that citizens and troops alike from the United States would
be subject to trial and punishment for war crimes. 4 '
The War Crimes Act of 1996 provides for criminal penalties,
including the death penalty, where any person, whether inside or
outside the United States, commits a war crime, provided that
the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war
136 See Thomas Geraghty, The Criminal-Enemy Distinction: Prosecuting a Limited
War Against Terrorism Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 33
McGEORGE L. REV. 551, 552 (2002); George Kuempel, Pilot Would Have Protected
Plane, Sister-in-law Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001.
137 Moore, supra note 74, at §1127.
138 Id.
139 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 71.
140 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2241(b), 2241(c) (2000).
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crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a
national of the United States. As used in the applicable statute
the term "war crime" means any conduct (1) defined as a grave
breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the
United States is a party; (2) PROHIBITED BY Article 23, 25,
27 or 28 of the Annex to Hague Convention IV, Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907; (3)
which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the
international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or
any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party and which deals with non-international armed
141
conflict ....
The question remains whether those selected to be tried by
military commission will be accused of war crimes, or whether
their violations will be characterized solely as terrorist actions.
The Bush administration has thus far indicated through its rhetoric
that what occurred on September 1 I was terrorism, not an act of
war. The United States set up a detention center in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba to hold prisoners captured in the war on terrorism.1 42 In
February of 2002, President Bush declared the detainees to be
"unlawful combatants. 143
[Unlawful combatants] was the term applied by the Supreme
Court in its 1942 decision upholding military tribunals for a
group of German saboteurs who had slipped into the United
States. In that ruling, the justices said spies and saboteurs were
violators of the law of war and so were not entitled to prisoner-
of-war protections. 1
44
The Bush administration has therefore aptly chosen
terminology in its classification of prisoners captured in the war on
terrorism, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent allowing
141 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 10 (2002) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2441(a), 2441(b),
2441(c)).
142 See Life in a Guantanamo Cell, BBC News: Americas (Feb, 7, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1766037.stm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
143 Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, from the White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Office of Communications (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WL
191071.
144 William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The Justice System; Critics' Attack
On Tribunals Turns to Law Among Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at B 1.
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military commission trials for actors thus labeled.145 On the other
hand, an obvious concern arises that the United States may be
setting a dangerous precedent for its own troops who may be
captured in conflicts on foreign soil, if the captors deemed the
actions of those troops to be illegitimate.'46
Classifying the prisoners captured in Afghanistan and
elsewhere as a result of the war on terrorism as "unlawful
combatants" is a potentially dangerous line to draw in the current
circumstances. The Taliban was in control of Afghanistan when
the al Qaeda flourished there, though it was not recognized as a
legitimate government by the United States.'47 I would thus argue
that Taliban combatants could fall under the third category of
prisoners of war, namely "[m]embers of regular armed forces who
profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized
by the detaining power."'48  Apparently, this third category of
prisoners of war has not even been mentioned by the
administration or anyone commenting on the classifications of
those held in Cuba. Instead, the second provision is the one that is
routinely cited - mistakenly, I believe, as it is the only provision
that must be satisfied in order for a detainee to be afforded
prisoner of war status. The Third Geneva Convention clearly
states that only one of the three provisions must be satisfied in
order to obtain prisoner of war status.'49
With the announcement that the detainees would not be
afforded prisoner of war status, the administration claimed its
actions were consistent with the spirit of the Geneva
Conventions. 5 ' President Bush announced that the Taliban would
145 See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
146 Glaberson, supra note 144; see also supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
147 Taliban Reach Zenith? Taliban Regime May Have Reached Its Height of Power
in Afghanistan, 85 NATIONAL DEFENSE 10 (Oct. 1, 2000); Imtiaz Gul, Western Diplomats
Meet Afghan Taliban Amidst Hopes of Seeing Detainees Again, DEUTSCHE PRESS-
AGENTUR, Aug. 28, 2001.
148 Geneva Convention, supra note 119, at art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 4-5, 972 U.N.T.S. at
138.
149 Id.
150 Statement by Ari Fleischer, Press Secretary, the White House Office of
Communications (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WL 191074 [hereinafter Fleischer
Statement] ("Consistent with American values and the principles of the Geneva
Convention, the United States has treated and will continue to treat all Taliban and al
Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo Bay humanely and consistent with the principles of the
Geneva Convention."). Joseph Choate, American representative at the Hague
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be afforded protections under the Geneva Conventions, although
not prisoner of war status, because Afghanistan is a party to the
Conventions (despite the fact that the United States did not
recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government). 51
The administration stated that those captured, in order to be
afforded prisoner of war status, would have had to have met the
four conditions set forth in the second provision discussed above:
They would have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would
have to have worn uniforms or other distinctive signs visible at a
distance; they would have to have carried arms openly; and they
would have to have conducted their military operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. The Taliban have
not effectively distinguished themselves from the civilian
population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.... [T]hey have knowingly adopted and provided support
to the unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is
an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state
party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not
covered by the Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to POW
status under the treaty.... The president has maintained the
United States' commitment to the principles of the Geneva
Convention, while recognizing that the Convention simply does
cover every situation in which people may be captured or
detained by military forces, as we see in Afghanistan today.
152
The administration thus failed to acknowledge other provisions
of the Geneva Conventions that might apply to Taliban or al
Qaeda fighters, instead only applying one of the provisions then
going on to focus on the fact that war crimes had likely been
committed, which really has nothing to do with determining
prisoner of war status. When questioned about how the United
States could make such a distinction based on uniforms and
carrying open arms and still protect our special forces who often
do neither,'53 Mr. Fleischer responded, "[t]he terms of the Geneva
Conferences, reflected that the accomplishments at the First Hague Conference,
including the codification of the laws and customs of war (e.g. regarding the
classification of belligerents) were "in the spirit of an enlarged humanity" and
contributed to the "practical promotion of the cause of peace." CHOATE, supra note 48,
at 12-13.
151 Fleischer Statement, supra note 150.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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Convention apply to all, and those terms speak for themselves."'' 54
This answer, if it can be termed as such, is highly problematic and
illustrates the reason for concern that the current administration is
setting a precedent that could potentially threaten the safety of our
armed forces, now and in future conflicts.
The administration further sought to minimize the implications
of its decision, focusing the attention of the public on arguably
trivial privileges afforded to prisoners of war:
The detainees will receive much of the treatment normally
afforded to POWs by the Third Geneva Convention. However,
the detainees will not receive some of the specific privileges
afforded to POWs, including: access to a canteen to purchase
food, soap and tobacco;... and the ability to receive scientific
equipment, musical instruments, or sports outfits.1
55
The decision to categorize the detainees as unlawful
combatants has far-reaching implications beyond whether those
captured will be able to access sports outfits. Customary
international law and the law of war both draw distinctions
between unlawful and lawful combatants. 56 "Lawful combatants
are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by
opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful."'5 7 Thus the administration made all
detainees subject to trial by military commission in distinguishing
them as unlawful rather than lawful combatants.
The United States War Department (predecessor to the U.S.
Department of Defense) promulgated the Rules of Land Warfare
'54 Id.
155 Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, from the White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Office of Communications (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WL
191071.
156 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
157 Id. at 31. Additionally, Article 102 of the Third Geneva Convention indicates
that prisoners of war may only be tried by courts-martial or civilian courts. Geneva
Convention, supra note 119 at art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 74. Further, Article 103 mandates
that if prisoners of war are detained while awaiting trial, which is only allowed if
national security demands it, "in no circumstances shall this confinement exceed three
months." Geneva Convention, supra note 119 at art. 103, 6 U.S.T. at 74. Thus by
denying prisoner of war status to those held at Guantanamo Bay, the Bush administration
has effectively skirted the Third Geneva Convention's policies regarding indefinite
detentions.
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to guide the Army in the practical aspects of dealing with
combatants taken prisoner during conflict.158 In the 1940 Rules of
Land Warfare, Paragraph 9 distinguishes between lawful and
unlawful belligerents, with the defining characteristic being the
carrying of arms openly and the wearing of a fixed and distinctive
emblem.'
Paragraph 351 provides that "men and bodies of men, who,
without being lawful belligerents" "nevertheless commit hostile
acts of any kind" are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of
war if captured and may be tried by military commission and
punished by death or lesser punishment. And paragraph 352
provides that "armed prowlers ... or persons of the enemy
territory who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the
purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or
canals, of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the
telegraph wires, are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war." ... Our Government, by thus defining lawful belligerents
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, has recognized that
there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that
privilege, including those who, though combatants, do not wear
"fixed and distinctive emblems."'' 60
All in all, it is relatively clear that following Supreme Court
precedent, the Third Geneva Convention, the Rules of Land
Warfare, and customary international law, there is a class of
fighters, namely unlawful combatants, who have been deemed not
to deserve the protections of the Third Geneva Convention
through classification as prisoners of war. Therefore, if the
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters have accurately been described as
unlawful combatants they should not be afforded prisoner of war
status and are thus subject to trials by lawfully convened military
commissions. In contrast, I assert that under the third category of
the Third Geneva Convention, Taliban fighters may have been
afforded prisoner of war status; and that in its definition of
158 UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT, RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1940).
159 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 34.
160 Id. at 34-35. Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention indicates that if there is
any doubt as to the status of a combatant under Article 4, that "such persons shall enjoy
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal." Geneva Convention, supra note 119 at art. 5, 6
U.S.T. at 7-8. But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 198 (4th Cir. Va.
Jan. 8, 2003) (holding that the Geneva Convention is not a self-executing instrument and
thus challenges regarding Article 5 should be vindicated through diplomatic means).
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unlawful combatants, the Bush administration could be setting a
dangerous precedent for U.S. forces.
[T]he danger is that in pursuit of security, we end up sacrificing
crucial liberties, thereby weakening our common security, not
strengthening it-and thereby corroding the vessel of
democratic government from within. Whether the question
involves the treatment of minorities here in the West, or the
rights of migrants and asylum seekers, or the presumption of
innocence or the right to due process under the law-vigilance
must be exercised by all thoughtful citizens to ensure that entire
groups in our societies are not tarred with one broad brush and
punished for the reprehensible behaviour of a few.'
61
V. Proposed Legislation After September 11, 2001
This section will highlight the attempts of a few members of
Congress to establish procedures for military commissions to try
terrorists captured after September 11, 2001. It is significant that
some members of Congress saw fit to act in this arena, in
anticipation of presidential action, illustrating the tug-of-war
between Congress and the President that so often occurs in the
"zone of twilight" where the two branches have concurrent
authority to act. 1
62
A. Military Commission Procedures Act of2002
In February 2002, Senators Specter (R-PA) and Durbin (D-IL)
introduced a bill entitled the Military Commission Procedures Act
of 2002,163 intended to respond to the President's Military
Commission Order of November 13, 2001.164 The two senators
thought that it was Congress's duty to determine the proper trial
procedures for military commissions, pursuant to Article I, section
8 of the Constitution.1
65
We have already legislated in part, delegating to the President
161 Annan Statement, supra note 45.
162 See supra Part I.
163 Military Commission Procedures Act of 2002, S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2002).
164 See infra Part VI.
165 148 CONG. REC. S733-01 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Specter
regarding S. 1937, a "bill to set forth certain requirements for trials and sentencing by
military commissions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services")
[hereinafter Specter Statement].
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the authority to establish military tribunals "by regulations
which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts,
but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this
chapter."'
166
The senators were especially concerned with the lack of
appellate review in the Military Commission Order, 16 viewing this
power stripping as suspending the right to a writ of habeas corpus,
an unconstitutional act unless necessary in times of rebellion or
invasion. 68  Thus, the bill introduced allows for a convicted
defendant to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. 69 The bill
also calls for the preservation of the right to counsel, as consistent
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'V
Perhaps as a gesture of compromise, the bill indicates that
there would be no Miranda rights for suspects being
interrogated.' The senators acknowledged the potential criticism
of this provision, but also recognized the importance of the
questioning soldiers' safety as well as the need to elicit
information that could potentially thwart further terrorist attacks. 72
Though unclear how Miranda warnings jeopardize the safety of
interrogators, it is plausible to assume that the warnings may
hinder information gathering. Senator Specter further stated that
he agreed with the President's decision not to afford al Qaeda or
Taliban members prisoner of war status, noting that they are
terrorists who murder innocent civilians. 73  He concluded by
calling for a minimum of basic due process rights for those tried
166 Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000)).
167 The President's Military Commission Order, in section 7, seems to preclude
review by any court in the world, and in section 4(c)(8), it is indicated that at a
minimum, "submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence,
for review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by
me for that purpose." Military Commission Order, supra note 6. See also infra Part VI.
168 Specter Statement, supra note 165, see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.").
169 Military Commission Procedures Act of 2002, S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2002).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Specter Statement, supra note 165.
173 Id.
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by military commission, but no more than the minimum. 74
Senator Durbin indicated that the purpose of the bill was to protect
the most basic rights of defendants and to ensure that the military
commissions were to be used only in the most narrow and
necessary circumstances.175
While this bill was set forth in the Senate to propose rules and
regulations that should be followed by the military commissions; it
acknowledged that the commissions were already a foregone
conclusion, despite the lack of a declaration of war on the part of
Congress.76 It provides for trial by military commission of non-
citizens whom the President determines
(1) there is a reason to believe that the individual, at the relevant
times, (A) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaeda; (B) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their
aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (C)
has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraph (A) or (B); and (2) it is in the interest of the
United States that such individual be subject to trial by military
commission on such charge.'77
The bill further calls for a unanimous vote for a guilty verdict
regarding a capital offence punishable by death, and a two-thirds
vote for a finding of guilty on other offenses.7 8 The primary
difference between this bill and the Military Commission Rules
promulgated by the Defense Department 7 9 is that this bill provides
for an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Military Commissions (a
new court established by the bill), and ultimate review by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 8 °
174 Id.
175 148 CONG. REC. S733-01 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin
regarding S. 1937, a "bill to set forth certain requirements for trials and sentencing by
military commissions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services")
[hereinafter Durbin Statement].
176 Military Commission Procedures Act of 2002, S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2002).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Military Commission Rules, supra note 6; see also infra Part VI.
180 S. 1937.
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B. Foreign Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of
2001181
In December of 2001, Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)
introduced this bill "[t]o authorize the President to convene
military tribunals for the trial [of those] apprehended in connection
with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United
States."'8 2  The bill provides the President with authority to
"convene military tribunals for the trial of individuals subject to
this Act who are charged with offenses arising from" the
attacks.'83 The bill specifies that such tribunals may only be held
outside of the United States, and also contains a sunset provision
of December 31, 2005.184
The Act would apply to individuals who are not citizens of the
United States or lawfully admitted alien permanent residents, and
who are apprehended outside of the United States.'85 Similar to
the Military Commission Procedures Act, this bill preserves the
right of a petition for habeas corpus.'86
Both of the proposed legislations set forth above, as introduced
into Congress, proved to be not too far off from the Military
Commission Order that was eventually set forth by the
President.'87 A common provision in all three states that only non-
U.S. citizens shall be tried by any military commission.'88 A
provision common in both of the proposed acts, one noticeably
lacking in the President's Military Commission Order, is the
preservation of the right of habeas corpus, a right that may only be
suspended during invasions or rebellions.'89 The next section of
this comment will examine the President's Military Commission
Order in detail.
181 H.R. 3468, 107th Cong. (2001).
182 Id.
183 Id. at § 2(a).
184 Id. at §§ 2(b), 2(d).
185 Id. at § 3.
186 Id. at § 5.
187 See infra Part VI(B).
188 H.R. 3468, 107th Cong. § 3; Military Commission Procedures Act of 2002, S.
1937, 107thCong. (2002).
189 H.R. 3468, 107th Cong. § 5.
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VI. Executive and Legislative Enactments After September 11,
2001
A. Authorization for Use of Military Force9 °
Just seven days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, an authorization for the use of military
force was passed 9' pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. 9 2 The
Authorization provides that the
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons. 93
B. Military Order: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism94
The White House issued a Military Commission Order on
November 13, 2001, regarding the "detention, treatment and trial
of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism."' 95  The
Military Commission Order defines those individuals subject to it
190 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
191 Id.
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed
against the United States and its citizens; and Whereas, such acts render it both
necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-
defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and
Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and Whereas, such acts
continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States; and Whereas, the President has authority
under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled.
Id.
192 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001).
193 S.J. Res. 23.
194 Military Commission Order, supra note 6.
195 Id.
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as certain non-citizens whom the President determines in writing
that
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,... (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
therefore[e], that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their
aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy .... 196
The language of this section is potentially overly broad, as its
scope covers an enormous number of people who would not
normally be considered terrorists by conventional standards.
Furthermore, there is no definition of "international terrorist" or
"international terrorism" anywhere in the Military Commission
Order, highly problematic in the subjectivity this allows in
defining those who are terrorists.' 97 For example, what if a foreign
manufacturer decided that it no longer wanted to import widgets
made in the United States, a decision that has a negative impact on
the U.S. economy? Will this manufacturer then fall under the
terminology of this Military Commission Order and thus be
considered a terrorist? What about Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince
Abdullah's proposal for peace between Israel and the
Palestinians," a proposal that potentially would change U.S.
foreign policy? Will the Saudi Prince now be subject to a trial
before a military tribunal? What about protestors who converge
on Washington to criticize U.S. foreign policy? 9 9 If one of these
protestors is a non-citizen, and her aim is to adversely affect U.S.
foreign policy, a highly subjective standard, then arguably this
person too would come within the language of the President's
Military Commission Order. It may seem ridiculous and far-
fetched to suggest that these examples are viable ones, a parade of
horribles so to speak. However, it is important for legal scholars
196 Id.
197 Daniel A. Rezneck & Jonathan F. Potter, Military Tribunals, the Constitution,
and the UCMJ, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV. 3, 3-4 (2002). "Perhaps the drafters, for reasons
of state and diplomacy, elected not to include a definition. Since some of our coalition
partners believe that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,' avoiding a
definition may avoid rocking the boat in which all are presently embarked." Id.
198 See Serge Schmemann, Saudi's Idea Stirs Hope in Israel and Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at A8.
199 See Karen Crummy, War on Terrorism; Protestors Call for Peace-Activists
Blame Attacks on U.S. Policy, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 30, 2001, at 5.
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to check drafting for overly broad and/or vague language so as not
to punish innocent people, or to cast a net that is so big that it
catches everyone in it.
The Bush administration is acting with proper motive, at least
one presumes, with this Military Commission Order. However, it
is not a far stretch to see why the language used may worry some
civil libertarians. Should the citizens of the United States and
those of a broader global community just sit back and hope that
the Bush administration will use their powers wisely and in ways
that do not offend our conscience? Some would say that the most
patriotic thing to do would be to throw our full support behind
anything that our leaders promulgate. Others, however, would
argue that patriotism is about having your voice be heard, no
matter what you have to say, whether you are a U. S. citizen or
not.
Further examining the Military Commission Order, Section 7
contains provisions regarding the relationship of the order to other
laws and forums."' 0
With respect to any individual subject to this order - (1) military
tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
offenses by the individual; and (2) the individual shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or have any such remedy or proceeding
sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United
States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation,
or (iii) any international tribunal.20'
This provision indicates that any individual detained under this
Military Order has absolutely no redress in any court in the world
for any wrongful acts of his captor. This result seems highly
problematic and overly limiting. Is the President suspending the
writ of habeas corpus? White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
acknowledged that the Military Commission Order could not and
did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, thus leaving an opening
for a challenge to the jurisdiction of a military commission in an
Article III court.20 2 Senator Durbin expressed his displeasure with
200 Military Commission Order, supra note 6, at 57835.
201 Id.
202 Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, November 30,
2001. Contrary to what is actually set out in the order, namely that the President has
ultimate review authority over military commissions, Gonzales states:
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the Military Commission Order, wary of its legal and policy
grounds: "Many commentators also raised legitimate concerns that
the [a]dministration's use of military tribunals could potentially
undermine our long-held foreign policy of criticizing other
nations' reliance on such tribunals. 2 °3  Senator Durbin was
disappointed that Congress was not consulted in any manner prior
to the release of the Military Commission Order.2 °4
The Constitution provides executive powers to the President, not
exclusive powers. Our Nation remains strong only if the co-
equal branches of government work together. Any proceeding
that takes place under President Bush's order will have to
withstand the test of legal scrutiny for years to come. But more
importantly, it will also have to pass the scrutiny of our citizens
at home and of our friends and enemies abroad who are
watching to see how the greatest democracy in history carries
out justice.205
Criticism also came from Mary Robinson, the United Nations
Human Rights Commissioner, who said that the planned military
commissions "skirt democratic guarantees. 20 6 She further pointed
out that democratic safeguards must be preserved even in times of
crisis. 207 "She said that the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks were crimes
against humanity meriting special measures but said that the plan
for secret trials was so overly broad and vaguely worded that it
threatened fundamental rights. 20 8
In a letter originating at Yale Law School, addressed to
The order preserves judicial review in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone
arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a military commission will be
able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction through a
habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court. The language of the order is
similar to the language of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin
Roosevelt that was construed by the Supreme Court to permit habeas corpus
review.
Id. It is worth noting that Gonzales is talking about Article III review if the military
commissions are held in the United States, and he says nothing about the lack of Article
III review for military commissions held outside of the United States.
203 Durbin Statement, supra note 175.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Elizabeth Olson, World Briefing United Nations: Rights Official Criticizes U.S.
Tribunal Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A6.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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Senator Leahy (D-VT), some 300 law professors protested
President Bush's military tribunal order, asserting, "the tribunals
are 'legally deficient, unnecessary and unwise.""'2 9  The
professors, representative of numerous institutions and political
ideals, stated that "the tribunals as outlined so far would violate
the separation of powers, would not comport with constitutional
standards of due process and would allow the president to violate
binding treaties."21 They further asserted that the use of such
tribunals "would undercut the ability of the United States to
protest when such tribunals are used against American citizens in
other countries."
21
'
Others argue that the use of the proposed tribunals "would
breach international law guaranteeing fair treatment of prisoners of
war."212  Additionally, "[t]he critics, among them legal experts
with military backgrounds, say the tribunals could create risks for
the armed forces, including the possibility of charges by other
countries that American officers who conduct tribunals are guilty
of war crimes."2 3 Further, some argue that it was unnecessary for
the Military Commission Order to allow the Secretary of Defense
to promulgate rules and procedures for the military commissions,
when provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice already
exist that are well-established and easily adaptable for use in
military commissions.214
Civil libertarians indeed had cause for concern, as "[o]ur chief
law enforcement officer, Attorney General John Ashcroft, told the
nation that 'foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the
United States are not entitled to and do not deserve the protections
of the American Constitution.' 2 5  Later, Attorney General
Ashcroft stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
September 25, 2001, that "'[t]he Justice Department will never
209 Katherine Seelye, A Nation Challenged The Military Tribunals; In Letter, 300
Law Professors Oppose Tribunals Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at B7.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Glaberson, supra note 144.
213 Id.
214 Rezneck & Potter, supra note 197, at 15.
215 Daniel H. Pollitt, Personal and Professional Responses to the Tragic Events of
September 11, 2001: Civil Liberties in Times of Crises 3 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation)
(quoting National Security State, 273 THE NATION, Dec. 17, 2001 at 5).
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waiver in our defense of the Constitution nor relent our defense of
civil rights.' 2 6  The American Civil Liberties Union expressed
concern that the President was "writing the judiciary out of the
picture altogether. The President's executive order.., represents
the ultimate form of court-stripping-literally removing Article III
courts from the picture with no provision for judicial review of the
tribunal's actions. 21 7 Kate Martin, Director for National Security
Studies, had harsh criticisms for the Bush Administration when
she spoke before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2001.2'
Martin expressed concern for the lack of public debate about the
use of military commissions, as well as the lack of congressional
notification.21 9
The lack of congressional notification is especially troubling in
light of the administration's simultaneous request to the
Congress to enact what was described as a comprehensive
package of new authorities needed to combat terrorism passed as
the USA PATRIOT Act. 220 The administration's conduct calls
into question its commitment to respecting the constitutional
separation of powers and role of the Congress. Indeed, all of
these actions would enhance the power of the Executive at the
expense of the constitutional roles of both the Congress and the
judiciary.221
Although it has been stated that Congress, not the President,
alone has the power to authorize military tribunals,222 this is not
entirely true. Precedent has established that presidential orders
216 Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals: Submitted Statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee Concerning Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, 107th Congress (2001) (statement for the
record of the American Civil Liberties Union), available at 2001 WL 1506625
(F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter ACLU Statement].
217 Id.
218 Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee Concerning Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism, 107th Congress (2001) (Statement of Kate Martin,
Director, Center for National Security Studies), available at 2001 WL 1506632
(F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Martin Statement].
219 Id.
220 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
221 Martin statement, supra note 218 (citation added).
222 Id.
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calling for military commissions have been found to be legitimate
even if not explicitly approved by Congress with independent,
current legislation.2 23  Nevertheless, there is a bill currently in
Congress that would explicitly authorize the use of military
tribunals.224  Martin further argued to the Senate Judiciary
Committee that promulgating the order without approval from
Congress violates the separation of powers: 225
When the Supreme Court approved the use of military
commissions in World War 1I, Congress had specifically
authorized their use in the Articles of War226 adopted to
prosecute the war against Germany and Japan.
Since the Supreme Court approved the use of military
commissions to try offenses against the laws of war in World
War II, the law of war and armed conflict has come to include
the requirements that even those characterized as unlawful
223 The Court in Exparte Quirin states:
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall
have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for offenses against the
law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction
of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the
rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war,
are cognizable by such tribunals. And the President, as Commander in Chief,
by his Proclamation in time of war has invoked that law. By his Order creating
the present Commission he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred
upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives
the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which
may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of
war.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942). See also Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at
513-14 (citations omitted).
224 Foreign Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2001, H.R. 3468, 107th
Cong. (2001).
225 Martin Statement, supra note 218.
226 What was formerly known as the Articles of War were repealed for the most part
in a restructuring of the Military Code. A few provisions were moved into new sections.
What stands today is United States Code, Title 10: Armed Forces, which is generally
contained in §§ 101-18505. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18505 (2000). The
Uniform Code of Military Justice is contained in Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 11, Chapter 47,
§§ 801-950, generally. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§
801-946 (2000). Title 50 of the United States Code contains provisions regarding War
and National Defense. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-2484 (2000).
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combatants accused of war crimes must be accorded
fundamental due process. Thus, any constitutionally authorized
military commissions would be bound by the current legal
obligations assumed by the United States. These would include
the United Nations charter and the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, none of which were in existence at the
time the Supreme Court approved the use of military
commissions during World War II ...
If military trials are deemed necessary for individuals captured
in Afghanistan or fleeing therefrom, the Congress should
authorize their use consistent with the requirements of due
process enshrined in the Constitution and the international
covenants agreed to by the United States.227
Martin goes on to discuss the importance of balancing
accountability and human rights, a balance she sees as possible
while simultaneously protecting national security interests.228
Despite these and many other arguments to the contrary, the
use of military commissions has been upheld, although no set of
predetermined rules has been laid out for their use. 229 Neither the
Uniform Code of Military Justice nor the Manual for Courts-
Martial set forth procedures for use in military commissions,
rather they make mention of them and seek to "preserve the
American commander's authority to exercise the entire power
recognized as his under international customs and usages of
war."
230
In enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950,
Congress reaffirmed its previous grant of authority to military
tribunals to try violations of the law of war. Article 18...
provides that: "general courts-martial also have jurisdiction to
try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a
military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by
the law of war." Similarly, Article 21 states that the provisions
of the Code which confer "jurisdiction upon courts-martial do
not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
227 Martin Statement, supra note 218 (citation added).
228 Id.
229 Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Punishing Offenses Against International
Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 659,
677 (1996).
230 Id.
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offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals., 2
31
Regarding the jurisdiction of the military commissions and the
classification of the detainees, it is again argued that the United
States could be setting an unwanted precedent for our own
troops.232 This is due to the fact that when military commissions
are used to try persons not associated with a regular armed force, a
precedent is being set that is a departure from "some of America's
most fundamental judicial traditions. ' '233 Additionally, critics
recognize the potentially negative foreign relations ramifications
that accompany the use of military tribunals.234
It is ultimately up to the President, however, to determine the
pros and cons of risks to intelligence and foreign policy that a
military commission may produce. 235 One such cost is the
compromising of U.S. intelligence efforts in discovering terrorist
plots and preventing future terrorist attacks. 236 This cost is due to
the disclosure of intelligence sources, methods, and investigative
techniques that may occur during Article III trials, such as that
which occurred during the 1993 trials of bombers of the World
Trade Center.237 On the other hand, military commissions would
not be required to disclose such sources, and different procedures
could be followed than those mandated in Article III courts. 238
Recognition that the Constitution is not a "suicide pact" allows
the government to participate in such cost/benefit analyses, which
may result in trials that lack some constitutional protections. 239
During wartime, "the government enjoys extraordinary power" to
make such determinations if national security concerns demand
231 Everett & Silliman, supra note 4, at 515 (citations omitted). See 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2000).
232 Bringing A1-Qaeda to Justice, The Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum:
Executive Summary, Nov. 5, 2001, No. 3.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 David B. Rivkin et al., Bringing A1-Qaeda to Justice: The Constitutionality of
Trying Al-Qaeda Terrorists in the Military Justice System, The Heritage Foundation
Legal Memorandum, November 5, 2001, No. 3 at 2.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963)).
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them.240 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[i]n any civilized
society the most important task is achieving a proper balance
between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both
suggest that this balance shifts in favor of order-in favor of the
government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being.,
241
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the United
States is not without precedent in trying those accused of terrorist
acts in Article III courts:
In the past, the United States has treated individuals accused of
terrorism as civilians, subject to trial in the federal courts
established under Article III of the Constitution, with the full
application of the Bill of Rights .... This was the case, for
example, following the first attack on the World Trade Center in
1993.... Moreover, such treatment may have been
Constitutionally mandated, since civilians are not ordinarily
subject to military justice ..... 24
In fact, the United States Supreme Court mandated in the case
of Ex parte Milligan that trial by military commission "can never
be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of
the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed., 2
43
However, the Court in Ex parte Quirin held that enemies who
enter the United States for the purposes of committing destruction
and remain here without uniform are subject to military law and to
trial by military commission.244 The Court distinguished Milligan
on its facts, pointing out that Milligan was a non-belligerent.245 In
Ex parte Quirin the Court specifically held:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because [it is] in violation of the law of war. Citizens
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance[,] and direction enter this
240 Id.
241 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
222 (1998).
242 Rivkin, supra note 236, at 4.
243 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866).
244 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,46 (1942).
245 Id. at 45
2002]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.
2 46
The results can be harsh when a prisoner is classified as an
unlawful combatant, not deserving of the privileges of prisoner of
war status. 24 7  This is not unusual under the customary rules of
international law, where the protections associated with prisoner
of war status, for one committing warlike acts, are predicated on
an association with a lawful military organization.248
In further support for the domestic and international precedent
of trying accused terrorists in military commissions, it is argued by
some that prosecution of terrorists in Article III courts could prove
to be ineffective due to the failure of the United States to
successfully prosecute terrorists domestically. 249 Furthermore, it is
argued that constitutional procedures themselves may hinder the
effective detainment and prosecution of terrorists "as was the case
when the Clinton administration declined Sudan's offer in 1996 to
turn over Osama bin Laden because there was not sufficient
probable cause to try him in U.S. Courts. 25 °
One might wonder why existing international courts are not
adequate venues for trying international terrorists. It is argued that
they are not because:
[w]hile the International Criminal Court has been mentioned as
a possible venue, the treaty establishing it is not yet in force, its
jurisdiction does not include terrorist crimes and it does not have
retroactive jurisdiction. It would take many years to select a
prosecutor and judges, let alone prepare an indictment against
key terrorist figures. In the case of the Yugoslavia tribunal, it
took seven years to indict Slobodan Milosevic.
251
246 Id. at 37-38.
247 Rivkin, supra note 236, at 5.
248 Id. at 5.
249 Paul R. Williams & Michael P. Scharf, Commentary, Prosecute Terrorists on a
World Stage, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2001, at Opinion M5.
250 Id.
251 Id. See also Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Scott L. Silliman, Executive
Director for the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security) (discussing the
jurisdictional inadequacies of currently existing international tribunals to try terrorists)
[herinafter Silliman Testimony].
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C. Military Commission Order #1 from the Department of
Defense252
On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense released its
rules and guidelines for the military commissions253 that had been
ordered by President Bush 4.2 5  The Military Commission Rules
contain a lengthy section entitled "Procedures Accorded the
Accused," and detail procedures that are very similar to those used
in Article III, as well as those used in courts-martial, including:
presentment of the charges to the accused in a language he or she
understands; the presumption of innocence until proven guilty;
findings based on evidence presented at trial; appointment of
counsel if the accused requires such; access by the defense to
evidence that the prosecution intends to use at trial (in a timely
manner); the right of the accused not to testify at trial coupled with
the mandate that there be no adverse inference from this refusal; if
the accused elects to testify at trial, he or she will be subject to
cross-examination; the ability of the accused to present evidence
and confront adverse witnesses; provisions for the appointment of
interpreters if necessary; and the accused shall not be tried a
second time for a charge once a commission's finding on that
particular charge becomes final (in accordance with the Military
Commission Rules).255
The Military Commission Rules further call for a full and fair
trial that is carried out both impartially and expeditiously.
256
Surprisingly, the Military Commission Rules set forth that the
proceedings are to be held openly, but not surprisingly there are
252 Military Commission Rules, supra note 6.
253 Id.
Observers may be inclined to examine each separate provision and compare it to
what they know of the federal criminal court system or the court-martial system,
and feel that they might prefer a system that they were more comfortable
with.... [W]e believe that most people will find that taken together, they are
fair and balanced and that justice will be served in their application.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, United States Department of Defense News
Transcript, DOD News Briefing on Military Commissions, at http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Mar2002/t03212002_t0321sd.html (Mar. 21, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter
Rumsfeld Transcript].
254 Military Commission Order, supra note 6.
255 Id. § 5.
256 Id. § 6(B).
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numerous conditions and exceptions enumerated. 257 Among these
exceptions are: 1) if closing the proceedings would protect
classified or classifiable information; 2) if the information at risk
of being disclosed is protected by law or rule from unauthorized
disclosure; 3) if an open trial would endanger the physical safety
of anyone involved in the commission; or 4) the all-encompassing
exception for "other national security interests. 258 Interestingly,
and somewhat problematically, the civilian defense counsel and
the accused may both be excluded from a proceeding for the
above-mentioned reasons.25 9  However, the detailed defense
counsel, appointed by the Chief Defense Counsel of the
commissions (and a judge advocate of any armed force of the
United States), may never be excluded from any of the
proceedings, for any reason, presumably leaving the accused with
some measure of procedural protections.26 ° When allowed to be
open, the provisions are quite liberal for just how open the
proceedings may be:
Open proceedings may include, at the discretion of the
Appointing Authority, attendance by the public and accredited
press, and public release of transcripts at the appropriate time.
Proceedings should be open to the maximum extent practicable.
Photography, video, or audio broadcasting, or recording of or at
Commission proceedings shall be prohibited, except
photography, video, and audio recording by the Commission
pursuant to the discretion of the Presiding Officer as necessary
for preservation of the record of trial.2 6'
Evidence is admitted, at the discretion of the Presiding Officer,
if it "would have probative value to a reasonable person.
262
Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Secretary of Defense) explained that
during war, procedures for military commissions of this nature
demand more inclusive rules of evidence than are used in Article
III criminal trials.263 "In wartime, it may be difficult to locate
witnesses or establish chains of custody for documents. Critical
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.; id. § 6(C)(2).
261 Id. § 6(B).
262 Id. § 6(D)(I).
263 Rumsfeld Transcript, supra note 253.
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evidence that could protect the American people from dangerous
terrorists should not be excluded simply because it was obtained
under conditions of war., 26
4
In regard to deliberations for findings of guilt and sentencing,
the Military Commission Rules provide that deliberations will be
closed, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, two-
thirds of the commission members must agree for a finding of
guilty to be accepted, two-thirds of the members must agree to
determine the sentence for the defendant, and a unanimous vote is
required for a death sentence. 265 The Military Commission Rules
further provide that there must be seven members on a
commission in order for the death penalty to be considered as a
possible sentence; and that other possible punishments include a
life sentence, fines or restitution, or "such other lawful punishment
or condition of punishment as the Commission shall determine to
be proper. 2 66
The Military Commission Rules do provide for a multi-step
review process, but not outside a relatively narrow sphere of
military officers, the Secretary of Defense, the appointing
authority, and the President.267  Beyond that, there are no
provisions for appeals to any court of the United States or any
international body. The President will himself determine which
individuals will be subject to the order, with the caveat that such
an individual may not be a U.S. citizen. 68
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed his
satisfaction with the procedures set forth in the Military
Commission Rules as well as the process that was undertaken to
codify them:
I am personally very comfortable with these procedures. They
are in fact fair, they are balanced, they are just. And I am also
very proud of the process that we went through to get to these
procedures.... It is well-suited to protect not only the rights of
264 Id.
265 Military Commission Rules, supra note 6, § 6(F).
266 Id. § 6(G).
267 Id. § 6(H)(3)-(6).
268 Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes, United States
Department of Defense News Transcript, DOD News Briefing on Military Commissions,
Mar. 21, 2002, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03212002 t0321sd.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation) [hereinafter Haynes Transcript].
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the accused, but also, as the secretary mentioned, the safety of
the participants in the trials, and also to protect our intelligence
in the ongoing war on global terrorism. And finally, and very
importantly, I have absolute faith in the men and women of our
armed forces who, when called upon to participate in these
commissions, will do their utmost to ensure a very fair,
forthright, honest trial.269
Others have not been as pleased with the Military Commission
Order or the Military Commission Rules, expressing concerns
over the indefinite detentions of those captured and labeled as
unlawful combatants. 7 ° In response, the Bush administration
stated that they are "well within their rights to hold enemy
combatants for the duration of the conflict, a conflict that
admittedly has no end in sight.' '271  Hence, the concern over the
legality of indefinite detentions, as a war on terrorism would seem
to have no ending point, save the settlement of all grievances the
whole world over. The following statement by the Under
Secretary of Defense, Douglas Feith, illustrates the vagueness of
this notion of a war on terrorism:
[T]here has been for many years a debate about the nature of
terrorism, and is it more in the nature of war or is it more in the
nature of crime? And what was driven home by September 11 th
was obviously that it's both .... The enemy in this war, as
opposed to past wars, is not, by and large, the regular armed
forces of a country, wearing uniforms and attacking enemy
armed forces. Here the enemy is a terrorist network with people
who do not distinguish themselves as-in uniforms as soldiers,
and their principal targets of attack are not armed forces but
civilians.272
As to how the President has the authority to order military
commissions when Congress has not yet declared war, Department
269 Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United
States Department of Defense News Transcript, DOD News Briefing on Military
Commissions, Mar. 21, 2002, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/
t03212002_t0321sd.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
270 Haynes Transcript, supra note 268.
271 Id.
272 Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, United States Department of Defense
News Transcript, DOD News Briefing on Military Commissions, Mar. 21, 2002, at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03212002_tO321sd.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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of Defense General Counsel Haynes stated that such an order is
not limited to times of declared war.273 He pointed out that the
authority to order military commissions arises under Article II of
the Constitution, which exists regardless of a state of peace or a
state of war.274  He further stated that regardless of the fact that
Congress did not officially declare war, the United States is clearly
in a "war situation" and thus, presumably, the President is acting
accordingly in his response. 5
Although many have expressed concern over the overly broad
language of the executive order creating the military commissions,
surprisingly, an article in the Journal of the American Bar
Association (ABA) praised the procedures set forth by the Military
Commission Rules, stating that the Bush administration took those
fears into account with their promulgated rules. 276 Plus, "[a]t the
same time, they retain the qualities the Bush administration says
are needed to conduct swift trials outside the United States in
order to protect witnesses, citizens, and military operations. 277 In
fact, Robert A. Clifford, the chair of the ABA's Terrorism and the
Law Task Force, indicated that the ABA would send a
congratulatory letter to Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary, in
praise of his "responsiveness to the legal community's call for
caution and concern about the many due process and attorney-
client issues associated with the prosecution of the detainees. 278
273 Haynes Transcript, supra note 268.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Molly McDonough, Pentagon Releases Rules on Tribunals: Rules Match Many
ABA Task Force Recommendations, 1 A.B.A. J. eReport Issue 11 (2002),
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m22trib.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
277 Id.
278 Id. In stark contrast, Robert E. Hirshon, President of the American Bar
Association, expressed a deeply troubled sentiment over the Military Commission Rules,
especially with regards to provisions that would allow eavesdropping on attorney-client
communications if there is a reasonable suspicion that information regarding future acts
of terrorism would be discussed. ABA Leadership: Statement of Robert E. Hirshon,
President, American Bar Association, Nov. 9, 2001, at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/justice department.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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Conclusion
Words cannot begin to capture the profound terror and grief
that gripped the United States on September 11, 2001. The
impacts of terrorist actions are rarely, if ever, limited to only one
community or one nation, as all humans are starkly reminded of
their mortality and vulnerability. "It is, of course, recognized that
a particular crime may cause such emotional reaction that it is
difficult, if not impossible, for the one charged with its
commission to receive a fair and impartial trial. 279 It is important
that guilt and criminality are established for an accused before one
considers possible punishments for an individual. This can be a
difficult task when "embroiled in passion" that is incited by the
high emotions caused by such catastrophic events.280 In such
circumstances, it is likely not a high priority of those enflamed by
anger to ensure that the accused receive a fair trial, and even if it
is, those looking from the outside may have trouble believing that
a fair trial will take place. 28 ' The danger is that from the viewpoint
of the outsider, the trial will appear to result from a cry for
vengeance as opposed to a rational desire for just punishment. In
1945, President Harry Truman read the words of Justice Robert
Jackson:
You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a
court.... if you are not willing to see him freed if not proved
guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there
279 APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
280 Id. at 10.
281 Id. Silliman discussed the potential diplomatic fallout from the use of military
commissions:
It was but five years ago that the United States roundly condemned the
conviction by a military tribunal in Peru of New York native Lori Berenson on
charges of terrorism. Through official channels, we requested that she be
retried in a civilian court because of the lack of due process afforded her in the
tribunal. Our cries of unfairness were echoed by United Nations officials who
openly criticized Peru's anti-terrorism military courts. There seems little
difference in the measure of due process afforded Berenson in Peru and what is
called for under the President's military order, and I believe this opens us to a
charge of hypocrisy from the international community.
Silliman Testimony, supra note 251.
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is no occasion for a trial, the world yields no respect to courts
that are merely organized to convict.
282
Justice Murphy aptly warned that if a peaceful international
community, based on foundations of human rights and dignity is
desired,
it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of
those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly
stigma of revenge and vindictiveness. Justice must be tempered
by compassion rather than by vengeance.... Otherwise stark
retribution will be free to masquerade in a cloak of false
legalism. And the hatred and cynicism engendered by that
retribution will supplant the great ideals to which this nation is
dedicated.283
Woodrow Wilson warned of the repercussions of filling people
with the spirit of vengeance as motivation for entering into
hostilities with other peoples or nations:
Once [you] lead this people into war and they'll forget there
ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal
and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the
very fiber of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the
284policeman on the beat, the man on the street.
We have to hope that the Bush administration will keep
American, and in fact global, ideals of fundamental justice in mind
and use its power accordingly in its selection of those to be tried
by military commission and in its oversight of the process. The
United States, in hand with the rest of the world, must continue to
engage in productive dialogue on issues of foreign policy in order
to allow truly compromised solutions to evolve. This is much
favored over the self-destructive tendency of dismissing ideas that
are different from our own.
In conclusion, history, customary international law, statutes,
international treaties, and Supreme Court precedent establish that
military commissions are a legitimate means of trying
international terrorists. However, it is necessary to wait and see
how they will proceed once individuals have actually been
282 MAGUIRE, supra note 35, at 98 (quoting ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL 69 (1984)).
283 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
284 Pollitt, supra note 215, at 3 (quoted in Alan M. Winkler, President Can't Wage
Successful War ifPublic Doesn't Want It, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 23, 1998).
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selected and tried, before conclusions of whether justice has been
served can be reached. In fact, as of December 2002, not one
military commission has been convened.285  The Bush
administration has been careful and deliberate thus far in creating
and promulgating the rules for the commissions. One can only
hope that the operation of the military commissions will be equally
careful and deliberate in providing justice that will stand up to the
ideals of a world community, not just the standards of those who
seek retribution. 86
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285 Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: Military Justice; Administration's
Position Shifts on Plans for Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A8.
286 Kofi Annan eloquently summarized the balance that must be struck between
protectionism and anti-terrorism:
Terrorism is one of the threats against which States must protect their citizens.
States have not only the right but also the duty to do so. But States must also
take the greatest care to ensure that counter-terrorism measures do not mutate
into measures used to cloak, or justify, violations of human rights. Terrorism
has a nasty habit of causing the whole spectrum of opinion in a society to lurch
in a repressive direction.
Annan statement, supra note 45.
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